Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1996

The State of Utah v. Randy J. Montoya : Unknown
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joan C Watt; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant.
J Kevin Murphy; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; Richard S
Shepherd; Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, State of Utah v. Montoya, No. 960227 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/166

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

O F F I C E OF THE A T T O R N E Y

GENERAL

FILED

4

Utah Court of Appeals

%•*896

JAN

MAR 1 7 1997

y

Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

GRAHAM

ATTORNEY GENERAL
CAROL CLAWSON

REED RICHARDS

Solicitor General

Chief Deputy Attorney General

March 14, 1997
Ms. Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of Court
Utah Court of Appeals
230 S. 500 E. #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

PALMER DEPAULIS
Chief of Staff

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
DOCKET NO. ° H p 0 2 2 - f - Cf\

Re: Citation of supplemental authority - State v. Montoya, 960227-CA
Dear Ms. Branch,
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(1), the State submits the following supplemental
citations of authority:
Mincey v. Arizona. 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, and 2413 n.6 and n.7 (1978)
Wayne v. United States. 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.), cert.denied. 84
S.Ct. 125 (1963)
United States v. Borchardt. 809 F.2d 1115, 1117-1118 (5th Cir. 1987)
People v. Stevenson. 51 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1239-1240, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d
878, 881 (Dec. 23, 1996)
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801-366-0167

Undersigned counsel was not on the brief and filed his notice of appearance in
this case February 18, 1997. The above citations were discovered during his
preparation for oral argument. They are relevant to Points I.C. and II. of the State's
brief. A copy of People v. Stevenson is attached.
Sincerely,

'BARNARD N. MADSEN
Assistant Attorney General
cc:

Joan C. Watt
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assoc.
424 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attachment: People v. Stevenson

59 Cal.Rptr.2d 878
96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9405, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R.
(Cite as: 51 Cal.App.4th 1234, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 878)
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Jeffrey Andre STEVENSON, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. B097213.
Court of Appeal, Second District,
Division 4.
Dec. 23, 1996.
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repeated questioning of officer and emergency room
physician, that he swallowed six to eight pieces of
rock cocaine; arresting officer had reasonable belief
that suspect had consumed cocaine based upon
seeing him place his hand to his mouth, subsequent
recovery of cocaine dropped by suspect, and
presence of white residue in suspect's mouth, officer
knew cardiac arrest could result from cocaine
overdose, and suspect was anxious and had elevated
heart rate when received at hospital, putting him at
risk for acute myocardial infarction and
hemmorhagic stroke. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

Certified for Partial Publication [FN*]
FN* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules
976(b) and 976.1, this opinion is certified for
publication with the exception of parts n, HI, IV,
and V.
Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Los
Angeles County, No. YA024396, Douglas A.
McKee, J., of possession of controlled substance.
Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal, Baron,
J., held that rescue doctrine exception to Miranda
requirements applied to arrested suspect's
admission, upon repeated questioning of officer and
emergency room physician, that he swallowed six to
eight pieces of rock cocaine.
Affirmed.
[1] CRIMINAL LAW<S=> 412.1(2)
110k412.1(2)
Rescue doctrine exception to Miranda requirements
applied to arrested suspect's admission, upon
repeated questioning of officer and emergency room
physician, that he swallowed six to eight pieces of
rock cocaine; arresting officer had reasonable belief
that suspect had consumed cocaine based upon
seeing him place his hand to his mouth, subsequent
recovery of cocaine dropped by suspect, and
presence of white residue in suspect's mouth, officer
knew cardiac arrest could result from cocaine
overdose, and suspect was anxious and had elevated
heart rate when received at hospital, putting him at
risk for acute myocardial infarction and
hemmorhagic stroke. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
[1] CRIMINAL LAW<®=* 412.2(3)
110k412.2(3)
Rescue doctrine exception to Miranda requirements
applied to arrested suspect's admission, upon

[2] CRIMINAL LAW<&=* 412.2(3)
110k412.2(3)
When it is arrestee's life that is in jeopardy, rather
than life of victim, officer, or member of public at
large, police are nevertheless justified in asking
questions directed toward providing life-saving
medical treatment to arrestee without first
administering Miranda warnings.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5.
**879 *1235 Brett Harding Duxbury, Glendale,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George
Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Carol Wendelin Pollack, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, *1236 Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and David Andrew
Eldridge, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BARON, Associate Justice.
In this case we hold that the police may ask
questions of an arrestee which are prompted by a
concern that the arrestee's life is in danger as a
result of a possible overdose of narcotics without
first advising the arrestee of his Miranda rights.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Deputy Sheriff Richard Schlegel testified that he
was on routine patrol in a high narcotics area of Los
Angeles County on June 1, 1995, at about 12:30
a.m., when he first observed appellant Jeffrey
Andre Stevenson.
Appellant also saw Deputy
Schlegel and as the deputy approached appellant,
appellant turned and walked rapidly away while, at
the same time, placing something in his mouth. As
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59 Cal.Rptr.2d 878
(Cite as: 51 Cal.App.4th 1234, *1236, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, **879)
appellant lifted his hand to his mouth, Deputy
Schlegel saw a rock of cocaine drop to the ground.
Deputy Schlegel arrested appellant, recovered the
cocaine, looked in appellant's mouth and observed a
white residue in appellant's mouth. It looked to the
deputy as if appellant had chewed up cocaine.
Concerned about a possible overdose, Deputy
Schlegel immediately transported appellant to a local
hospital where he was treated by emergency room
physician Dr. Brian Harris.
In Dr. Harris's
opinion, appellant was at risk of acute myocardial
infarction and hemorrhagic stroke.
Appellant
became combative when the doctor attempted to
pump his stomach. Both Deputy Schlegel and Dr.
Harris repeatedly asked appellant if he had ingested
narcotics. Appellant continually denied ingesting
any controlled substances but eventually, after being
informed of the risk of coronary artery disease and
myocardial infarction, appellant reluctantly admitted
he had swallowed six to eight pieces of rock
cocaine. As a result, Dr. Harris again attempted to
pump appellant's stomach, but aborted the procedure
when appellant vomited macerated fragments of
what could have been cocaine and seemed in no
further danger of an overdose.
Appellant and his friends, Lavell Austin and
Anthony Breland, testified appellant had just left a
liquor store when he was arrested by Deputy
Schlegel for no apparent reason; they did not see
appellant with any cocaine and the officer did not
fmd any after searching the area. Appellant denied
possessing or ingesting cocaine or anything else
prior to his arrest. He *1237 denied that Deputy
Schlegel took him to the hospital immediately. They
stopped at the police station for five to ten minutes
on the way. He also denied telling Deputy Schlegel
or Dr. Harris that he swallowed cocaine. Appellant
admitted he bad been convicted of selling cocaine in
1988 and commercial burglary in 1992; since then
he has not used, possessed or sold cocaine and has
worked as an in- home nurse.
The jury convicted appellant of possession of a
controlled substance in violation of Health and
Safety Code section 11350. In a court trial, the
1988 sale of a controlled substance conviction was
found true by the court. (Pen.Code, § 667.5, subd.
(b); Heath & Saf.Code, § 11370, subds. (a) and
(c).) Appellant was sentenced to state prison for
four years, granted presentence credit of 180 days,

and ordered to pay a restitution fine of $1,000
pursuant to Government Code section 13967,
subdivision (a). This appeal followed.
••880 DISCUSSION
I.
The Suppression Motion
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
refusing to suppress evidence of his admission that
he had swallowed six to eight pieces of cocaine
because he had not been advised of his Miranda
rights (see Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S.
436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694)
before Deputy Schlegel and Dr. Harris questioned
him at the hospital. Appellant recognizes that the
"public safety" and "rescue" exceptions to Miranda
hold that "[w]hile life hangs in the balance, there is
no room to require admonitions concerning the right
to counsel and to remain silent." (People v. Dean
(1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 875, 882, 114 Cal.Rptr.
555.) However, appellant argues the emergency
doctrine only applies when the life of a victim, an
officer, or the public-at-iarge is at risk. Appellant
reasons thatM 'the need for answers to questions in a
situation posing a threat to the public safety
outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule
protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination* " (New York v. Quarles (1984)
467 U.S. 649, 657, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2632, 81
L.Ed.2d 550) but, "the need for answers to
questions in a situation posing a threat to a
defendant's own safety does not." Thus, according
to appellant, "[wjhere the police believe that a
defendant's own safety is threatened, they should not
be permitted to decide for defendant whether that
possible threat justifies an incursion upon his own
privilege against self-incrimination; the defendant
can ... make that decision for himself after being
properly Mirandized." We find this argument
untenable.
•1238 "[Tlbe two basics of the Miranda opinion
relevant here are (1) its assumption that the purpose
of custodial interrogation is to further criminal
prosecution, and (2) its public policy to outlaw
police misconduct relating to the third degree.
Neither point is central to the question of police
conduct in emergencies, where the primary objective
of police action is to save human life." (People v.
Riddle (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 563, 574, 148
Cal.Rptr. 170.)
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The scope and elements of what constitutes a valid
instance of exigent circumstances were well defined
in the Riddle case. There, the wife of a burglary
victim was missing. The police took the burglary
suspect into custody and initially asked him
questions about the whereabouts of the missing
woman without first advising him of his Miranda
rights. This was held not to be error. Riddle
determined that when the possibility of saving the
life of a missing victim exists, noncoercive questions
may be asked of a suspect in custody, even though
the answers to the questions may incriminate the
suspect. In reaching this decision, the court relied in
part on the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98
S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, which stated: "
' "The need to protect or preserve life or avoid
serious injury is justification for what would
otherwise be illegal absent exigency or emergency."
' [Citation.]" (83 Cal.App.3d at p. 572, 148
Cal.Rptr. 170.) The Riddle court then set forth
requirements which it deemed sufficient to excuse
noncompliance with Miranda: "1. Urgency of need
in that no other course of action promises relief; flU
2. The possibility of saving human life by rescuing a
person whose life is in danger; ffl] 3. Rescue as the
primary purpose and motive of the interrogators."
(Id. at p. 576, 148 Cal.Rptr. 170.)
The court in People v. McDermand (1984) 162
Cal.App.3d 770, 211 Cal.Rptr. 773, applied the
Riddle rescue doctrine in a situation where it was a
noncustodial murder suspect whose life was in
danger. The suspect had repeatedly stressed in
letters to the sheriff's department and to the press
his intent "not to be taken alive." In order to induce
the suspect to surrender, the police made false
promises and representations to the suspect that they
wanted to help not punish him which resulted in a
telephone call from the suspect in which he
confessed to the murder of his mother and brother.
(Id. at p. 794, 211 Cal.Rptr. 773.) In holding the
suspect's confession admissible, McDermand
pointed out that " 'an interrogation concerning
"rescue" might ordinarily have the dual purpose of
both rescue and incrimination, but **881 so long as
the developed facts show the motive behind the
interrogation to be primarily that of rescue, the
interrogation is justifiable despite an apparent
Miranda violation.' [Citation.]" (162 Cal.App.3d
at p. 797, 211 Cal.Rptr. 773, quoting People v.
Willis (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 433, 449, 163
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Cal.Rptr. 718.)
[1] In our view, this case also falls within the
purview of the rescue doctrine and we are satisfied
that all three Riddle requirements are present. The
•1239 deputy had a reasonable belief that appellant
had consumed cocaine based upon seeing appellant
place his hand to his mouth, the recovery of the rock
of cocaine which dropped from appellant's hand as
his hand went to his mouth, and the white residue in
his mouth. Deputy Schlegel had learned at the
sheriff's academy that cardiac arrest and death can
result from a cocaine overdose. Unsure of the
quantity of cocaine and concerned that appellant had
taken an overdose, the deputy questioned appellant
about the amount of cocaine he had ingested.
Appellant denied consuming cocaine, but the deputy
thought otherwise. Deputy Schlegel testified that he
felt he had an " obligation and responsibility" to
make sure that appellant was treated if appellant
had, in fact, consumed any narcotics. Thus, for
medical reasons, the deputy did not want to book
appellant and place him in custody at the station.
Instead, he took appellant to the hospital.
At the hospital, Deputy Schlegel informed Dr.
Harris that he believed appellant had consumed
cocaine. Dr. Harris testified that when appellant
was received at the hospital, his heart rate was very
elevated, he was anxious, very diaphoretic,
sweating, and appeared to be emotional. In the
doctor's opinion, appellant's elevated heart rate and
other aspects of the physical exam put him at risk
for acute myocardial infarction and hemorrhagic
stroke. The doctor had seen cardiovascular disease
and death and hemorrhagic stroke with people who
had ingested small amounts of cocaine. However,
other substances also cause a patient to exhibit
appellant's symptoms. The doctor attempted to
initiate a number of diagnostic modalities to
determine which substance appellant ingested,
including gastric lavage or pumping his stomach
which requires placing an oral gastric tube into his
stomach to remove the substances so they could be
sent to the lab for analysis. But appellant became
combative and would not allow any of the
procedures. Thus, the doctor could only rely on
"history." Accordingly, both the doctor and the
officer inquired many times of appellant if he had
ingested any controlled substances that evening.
Finally, after explaining to appellant the risk of
coronary artery disease and myocardial infarction,
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appellant reluctantly said he had swallowed some
rocks of cocaine.
[2] On the facts we have outlined, we see no
rational reason to exclude appellant from the reaches
of the rescue doctrine. When a life is in danger, the
law should make no distinctions. Accordingly,
when it is the arrestee's life which is in jeopardy,
the police are equally justified in asking questions
directed toward providing life-saving medical
treatment to the arrestee without first warning the
arrestee that his answers can be used against him in
a court of law. The Miranda advisement was meant
to protect an accused from the loss of his right to
silence not from the loss of his life. The doctrinal
underpinnings of Miranda do not require us to
exclude appellant's •1240 statement, thus penalizing
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the deputy for asking the very questions which were
the most crucial to the effort to provide appellant
with medical treatment. (Cf. New York v. Quarles,
supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 657- 658, 104 S.Ct. at pp.
2632-2633.)
II.-V. [FN**]
FN** See footnote *, ante.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
CHARLES S. VOGEL, P.J., and HASTINGS, J.,
concur.
END OF DOCUMENT
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